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Abstract 
The paper aims at providing an overview of economie evaluation 
problems regarding toxic materials, with special emphasis on persistent 
micro-pollutants. These issues will be analyzed from the viewpoint of 
ecological sustainability. 
After some introductory remarks the paper will spell out in more 
detail the externalities involved in hazardous materials production (in 
terms of health impacts, locational externalities and other social 
costs). It will be argued that such external impacts are in contrast 
with an ecologically sustainable development, as reflected inter alia in 
the care for human health or for future generations (in terms of inter-
temporal social costs, deprivation of meaningful development options, 
etc), the carrying capacity of the environment (in terms of reducing the 
user potential of the biosphere), and so forth. 
Various attempts in economics to assess in more precise (mainly 
monetary-economie) units the damage costs incurred by the environment 
will be reviewed concisely. Some attention will also be given to the 
potential of a social rate of discount for incorporating the interest of 
future generations. Given the high risks involved for future gener-
ations, a plea will be made to develop sustainable policy strategies 
based on quality standards. In order to stimulate a proper and legal 
disposal system for hazardous materials, a bonus system will be 
proposed. A multi-temporal optimal control model for such a deposit-
refund system will be developed as an analytical framework for policy 
analysis. The paper will be concluded with various items for a research 
agenda in the economics of a NIMBY syndrome. 
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1. Prologue 
Since the beginning of the 1970's already, many attempts have been 
made to devise environmental policies that were focussing the attention 
on long-term strategie issues (general environmental degradation, ex-
tinction of rare species etc). The future was mainly pictured by means 
of simulation models whose empirical validity however was not deeply 
rooted in observed facts. As a consequence, a wave of criticism emerged 
which in the past decade has almost led to a disappearance of such long-
term environmental management models. In recent years however, the 
awareness has grown that - despite considerable progress in coping with 
the impacts of 'ordinary' pollutants such as carbon-monoxide, sulfur-
dioxide, nitrogen oxides - the remaining category of pollutants (toxic 
materials, non-degradable waste) may be much more dangerous to human 
health and to the survival of many species or even entire ecosystems. 
Since the publication of the Brundtland Report (see WCED 1987) a 
global concern has arisen on ecologically sustainable economie develop-
ment. The crucial question here is whether economie progress (including 
technological transformation processes) is compatible with the ability 
of future generations to meet their own needs (in terms of both economie 
and environmental goods). There is sufficiënt empirical evidence which 
demonstrates clearly that a unilineal evolution of current trends will 
create disastrous outcomes for the next generations, so that we are 
facing a difficult choice situation in which the advantages and disad-
vantages of alternative development scenarios have to be traded off on 
the basis of both economie and environmental criteria, while taking into 
consideration the interest of future generations. 
From an economist's viewpoint there would be no reason to be con-
cerned about the interest of future generations, if the rate of 
environmental degradation would not be higher than the rate of tech-
nological progress in coping with environmental degradation. Indeed some 
economists claim that the future could be left to the next generations, 
as it is plausible that the next generations have even more options to 
deal with environmental issues than the current one (cf. Baumol 1968). 
However, the empirical justification of this assumption is very 
weak and there is by no means a plausible reasoning that this strategy 
would ensure a sustainable development. 
There is, however, one more problem. Various hazardous waste 
materials do not only have an ad hoc effect on the environment, but may 
have a long-term non-reversible effect, so that in that case future 
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generations will be deprived from feasible desirable environmental op-
tions. Especially, toxic materials and biologically non-degradable 
pollutants may jeopardise the potential of next generations. Persistent 
micropollutants (PMP's) are a good example of long-term environmental 
degradation that may not only reduce the range of options for the fu-
ture, but may also reduce the quality of life and even health of future 
generations. In this context, it is worthwhile to make a reference to 
Solow (1986), who - notwithstanding his modest concern on future gener-
ations - claims that they should have access to a certain Standard of 
living or level of consumption. 
An important question here is thus whether we have to allow for a 
flexible development path where - temporally or structurally - environ-
mental quality conditions might fall below a critical level or whether a 
strict system of environmental sustainability conditions would have to 
be imposed (e.g. by claiming that the level of future environmental 
capital may not fall below the current level) (see for instance, 
Ciriacy-Wantrup 1952 and Pearce 1988). The latter choice option would of 
course require a very strict and global environmental policy in the 
short run, as will be shown later on. 
There is another point which deserves some attention. To some ex-
tent the environment provides complementary inputs with respect to 
conventional inputs in the economie process. For instance, without a 
high quality environment agriculture is unable to generate an economi-
cally efficiënt and acceptable product quality (see Nijkamp and Soeteman 
1988). Thus the environment is part of the production function of the 
economy (see also Opschoor 1987 and Siebert 1982). It has to be well 
maintained - just like any other capital stock - and of course to be 
taken into account in planning strategies as a valuable scarce resource 
as well. Thus the environment does not only have the character of a 
consumption good (for short and long term need satisfaction), but also 
of an - often exhaustible - production factor (serving the efficiency 
needs of current and future generations in a productive sense). 
It is, however, difficult - if not impossible - to identify an 
optimal level of environmental capital that would guarantee the highest 
sustainability. In James et al (1989) five factors are mentioned which 
have to be taken into account: 
ethical notions such as the level of solidarity owed to future 
generations; 
the present and future degree of (riskless) substitution between 
the various elements of the environmental capital stock; 
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the present and future degree of (riskless) substitution between 
elements of environmental capital, man-made capital and human capi-
tal; 
the degree of robustness of the biosphere in accommodating dif-
ferent spatial distributions of economie activities and the 
associated environmental impacts; 
the future institutional capacities for managing or adapting to 
environmental changes. 
Clearly, the evaluation of the future against the present along two 
dimensions (economie progress and ecological sustainability) is far from 
easy. Besides, whether it would be acceptable to impose the condition 
that for PMP's the future level should not exceed the current level is a 
question which deserves more scientific research. In order to answer 
this question four stages would have to be considered: 
environmental monitoring (inventory of hazardous materials in the 
external environment); 
biological monitoring (identification of causal chain mechanisms in 
living organisms); 
biological effect monitoring (assessment of impacts on living 
organisms); 
health monitoring (evaluation of impacts on health). 
A good example of these stages can be found in the Netherlands in 
the area of soil pollution. At the moment all areas earmarked for new 
residential purposes have to be carefully investigated regarding the 
presence of toxic material; in this process the first stage is compul-
sory. If the soil concerned is polluted with hazardous waste materials, 
the next three steps will have to be foliowed. No permission for build-
ing dwellings will be granted, unless a 'clean statement' has been 
issued, sometimes after an extensive cleaning programme (in approx. 25 
percent of all cases in the Netherlands). The costs are extremely high, 
but in view of the risks involved (in terms of health costs to current 
and future generations), the decision has been taken to go for a 'risk-
free' strategy. Such a strategy does make sense if there is some 
evidence of future impacts on health conditions or on the quality of 
ecosystems. In the next section, more attention will be paid to external 
costs of hazardous materials in general and PMP's in particular. 
2. External Costs of PMP's 
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External costs of PMP's - and in general of hazardous materials and 
toxic waste - may be subsidivided into actual costs and potential costs. 
Actual costs refer to those sacrifices which have an immediate negative 
impact on the welfare position of an individual or the group under con-
sideration (including their health, their need for a well kept ecosystem 
etc). A usual phenomenon here is that everybody wants to enjoy the 
fruits of our welfare society, but that in general the social costs 
involved are not fully accounted for and hence transferred to others. 
This NIMBY (not-in-my-back-yard) phenomenon is particularly relevant in 
the case of locational issues (e.g., dumping of waste material, siting 
of a nuclear power plant etc). Thus it seems as though our economies are 
- at the level of individual decision making - trying to maximize in-
dividual benefits while at the same time the transfer of externalities 
to others is also maximized. This leads no doubt to sharp conflicts 
among different groups or places. Clearly, in various cases the transfer 
of externalities is not done purposely. For instance, according to 
Winteringham (1985, p.5) "of the growing range and weights of agrochemi-
cals (fertilizers, pesticides, etc) only small fractions of pesticides 
reach the target pests, and in the case of fertilizers nitrogen espe-
cially, usually little more than half is usefully recovered in the erop. 
Inevitably, proportions of the agrochemical 'residues' find their way 
out of the target area and they can impair environmental quality or harm 
non-target wildlife populations. These side-effects, which include the 
selection of entire field populations of pesticides-resistant pests, can 
reach unacceptable levels in tropical and temperate agricultural areas". 
Potential costs are latent costs which may emerge elsewhere 
(notably in the future), but so far they have not yet materialized as 
actual costs. Clearly, if such costs will be effectuated, they will 
affect the welfare level of the group concerned (i.e., the welfare of 
future generations). The problem is, however, that future generations 
cannot defend their rights and they do not have formal lawyers in an 
environmental court. Thus as a consequence their welfare level is co-
determined by the benevolence of the present generation. Thus the NIMBY 
phenomenon which is already very strong in current periods is even much 
stronger when it comes to future generations. As a consequence, the 
existence of many toxic dumps, PCB's in heating and air-conditioning 
systems, and potential pollution from herbicides and pesticides point to 
an built-in tendency toward jeopardizing the interest of the future (cf. 
Chatterji 1987). The following table may serve as an illustration. 
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WASTE GENERATION BY WASTE TYPE IN NEW YORK 
Waste Type 
Percent of Total 
Small Quantity 
Generator Waste 
Stream Accounted 
bv Each Waste Type 
Estimated Amount 
of Waste 
Generated in New 
York State by 
Waste Type 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
22. 
23. 
24. 
25. 
26. 
Arsenic Wastes 
Cyanide Wastes 
Dry Cleaning Filtration 
Residues 
Empty Pesticide Containers 
Heavy Metal Dust 
Heavy Metal Solutions 
Heavy Metal Waste Materials 
Ignitable Paint Wastes 
Ignitable Wastes 
Ink Sludges Containing 
Chromium or Lead 
Mercury Wastes 
Other Reactive Wastes 
Paint Waste Containing 
Heavy Metals 
Motor Freight Terminals 
Waste 
Photographic Wastes 
Solvent Still Bottoms 
Spent Plating Wastes 
Spent Solvents 
Solutions or Sludges 
Containing Silver 
Strong Acids or Alkalies 
Used Lead-Acid Batteries 
Waste Formaldehyde 
Waste Inks Containing 
Flammable Solvents or 
Heavy Metals 
Waste Pesticides 
Wastewater Containing 
Wood Preservatives 
Wastes containing Ammonia 
* 
* 
2 
1 
* 
* 
* 
1 
1 
* 
* 
* 
* 
3 
* 
1 
18 
1 
5 
62 
1 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
1,170 
585 
* 
* 
585 
585 
* 
585 
1,755 
* 
585 
10,520 
585 
2,925 
36,240 
585 
* 
* 
* 
100 ** 58,000 ** 
** 
This category represents less than one percent of total. 
The sum of the columns does not equal the total shown because the 
small categories of less than one percent are not shown. 
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PMP's may - through their cumulative effects and persistent nature 
- involve serious health and ecological risks. However, little is known 
about health effects (e.g., anemia, cancer, liver disease etc) and even 
less is known about long-term ecological effects (e.g., the impacts of 
the exponentially growing number of resistant pests). The potential 
costs mainly charged to future generations, however, have never been 
seriously estimated. 
Even the actual costs of hazardous waste (including PMP's) in terms 
of health effects are extremely difficult to assess, but may plausibly 
be assumed to be higher than expected. For instance, Williams (1987) 
refers to a recent article in the New York Times: "A recent, unreleased 
APA report, quoted in the New York Times in 1985 (October 3, page 1) 
said, '...at least, 7,000 accidents involving toxic chemicals have oc-
curred in the United States in the last five years, killing 135 and 
injuring nearly 1,500' ' with over 200,000 people requiring evacua-
tion'." In many cases, two general types of actions against hazardous 
waste are possible, viz. restricted use and restricted siting. 
In various cases, new sources of pollution (e.g., plants) have to 
install the best available treatment technology in order to meet strict 
environmental quality standards, although under certain conditions in 
the US the 'bubble principle' allows for an exchange between higher 
emissions of new sources and (at least) an equivalent reduction of ex-
isting sources. However, in case of persistent, accumulative and 
dangerous materials such as PMP's, a substitution between different 
pollutants in favour of a higher PMP emission does not seem to be an 
acceptable strategy in view of the potential long-term health effects. 
In that case, restrictions on emissions (e.g., by means of stringent 
control technologies) are the only way out. Changes in siting of the 
sources of such persistent pollutants make only sense from the viewpoint 
of a NIMBY attitude, but disregard the cumulative and un-anticipated 
future effects of PMP's. 
In view of the great many dangerous effects of toxic and hazardous 
waste, a variety of policy responses have emerged in the US, such as: 
implementation of stringent federal environmental standards to control 
all toxics releases to the environment, comprehensive and enforceable 
occupational health and safety programmes, and heavy financial penalties 
for regulatory violations. 
However, to make policies more acceptable and hence more effective, 
more information would be needed on the economie implications of PMP's. 
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In the next section, a concise critical overview of various economie 
evaluation methods in this field will be given. 
3. The Economie Toolbox 
Any attempt at evaluating in economie terms the consequences of 
dangerous materials should make a distinction between physical dose-
effect relationships, economie evaluation, and influences of policy 
controls. This is briefly sketched below. 
Actors ; 1 Pollu 
1 
,\ 
tion 
i 
y 
Damage 
effects 
1 Economie 
i ! 
i . -
Users 
> 
Waste 
df 
? 
evaluation 
^ 
i k 
> f
i 
•Abatement Policy 
Polic ies % Cont rols 
3.1 Dose-effect relationships 
Dose-effect relationships picture causal chains of effects from a 
source upon the ultimate target. Given the persistent and long-term 
nature of PMP's and the complexity of such causal chains the final im-
pacts of PMP's are usually difficult to assess. Such effects may be 
manifold. They may relate to both ecosystems such as reductions in the 
number of species, change in habitat, change in behaviour or in 
reproduction rate, sensitivity to diseases, increase in mortality rates 
(see Bunyan and Stanley, 1983) and human health (such as carcinogenic 
effects, allergie reactions, or neuro-toxic effects; see Strigini, 
1982). For PMP's especially the chronic toxic effects are extremely 
important, but precise impact assessments are for the time being very 
rare (see Ware, 1980). 
3.2 Economie evaluation 
There are various, sometimes competitive, ways of evaluating the 
damage effects of environmental pollution. Examples of such evaluation 
methods are: 
functional evaluation; this method refers to all (elimination and 
compensation) costs that are necessary to take account of the loss of 
environmental functions incurred by polluting activities; despite the 
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theoretical elegance of this method, it is lacking operationality in a 
practical policy context. 
enerpetic evaluation; this method aims at assessing environmental 
damage costs by assessing the embodied energy in all transformation 
processes involved; this energy flow method is essentially a 
limited approach, as it takes for granted the existence of a single 
basic production factor (i.e., energy) while neglecting influences 
from the demand side. 
evaluation of financial and amenity losses; this method attempts to 
estimate financial losses (i.e., the monetary value of changes in 
the demand for marketable goods and services as a result of en-
vironmental damage) and the amenity losses (i.e., the remaining 
(social or psychological) damage which is not directly embodied in 
financial losses); techniques for assessing the financial losses 
are amongst others: 
D social cost-benefit analysis 
D cost-effectiveness analysis 
D community impact analysis 
G shadow project analysis; 
techniques for assessing the amenity losses are inter alia: 
G surrogate markets (e.g., based on hedonic prices) 
G alternative (avoidance) costs 
D survey techniques 
G multicriteria analysis 
Thus there is a wide variety of different techniques available, and 
in various cases they have proven to be successful. However, in case of 
long-lasting effects of non-degradable pollutants hardly any operational 
evaluation method has been designed and used in practice. 
The potential (or latent) costs of PMP's are indeed extremely dif-
ficult to gauge. The assessment of actual costs is also difficult, but 
in this framework more attempts have been undertaken (see Eitjes and De 
Haan 1987). Here one may make a subdivision into economie damage to (1) 
human beings, (2) plant and animal species, and (3) water, air and soil. 
(1) Human beings. 
Financial losses refer here mainly to three categories, medical 
costs, loss in income and productivity, and psychic costs. Amenity 
losses may be assessed among others by means of human capital 
methods, implied valuation methods, or risk reduction methods (cf. 
Sussman 1984). An example of an assessment of costs of pesticide 
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use on human health can be found in Pimentel (1980) and is 
presented here for the sake of illustration. 
Human Poisining Costs Total costs 
1. Cost of hospitalized poisinings 
2,831 hospitalized poisinings x 3.7 
days in hospital x $127.70/day 
hospital fee $ 1,337,619 
2,831 hospitalized poisinings x 3.7 
days in hospital x $16.04/day doctor 
fee 168,014 
1,000 workers hospitalized poisinings 
x 6.67 days lost work x $34/day 226,780 
2. Cost of non-hospitalized poisinings 
30,000 physician treated x 1.5 physician 
visits x $20/visit 900 ,000 
40% Non-hospitalized physician treated 
x 42,200 physician treated x 6.67 days 
lost work x $34/day 3 , 828 , 046 
3. Cost of emergency room treated 
poisinings 
12,200 Emergency Room poisinings x 
$25/visit 305,000 
4. Cost of fatalities 
52 Accidental Fatalities x $1 million.. 52,000,000 
5. Cost of human cancer due to pesticides 
0.5% cancer x $25,000 million 125,000,000 
Total $183,765,459 
(2) Plant and animal species 
There is a variety of methods for assessing the costs of environ-
mental damage with regard to the flora and fauna, for instance, 
survey techniques, recreation evaluation methods, productivity 
assessment of agricultural land etc, although actual figures may 
incorporate many biases (see also Pimentel 1980) . 
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(3) Water, air and soil. 
These categories are transmitters of pollutants and may lead to a 
diversity of environmental damage costs. Accumulated obnoxious 
materials, synergetic effects and long-range effects make it espe-
cially difficult to assess in monetary terms the economie 
consequences of PMP's. Although it is known that such polluting 
materials may affect the productive functions, the regulating func-
tions, and the carrier and information functions of the natural 
environment, little information is as yet available on changes in 
these functions. 
In conclusion, besides dose-effect uncertainties, economics itself 
has not yet developed a reliable and acceptable toolbox for judging 
PMP's. Especially the complex causality relationships of non-degradable 
PMP's make it extremely difficult to arrive at politically meaningful 
references. 
3.3 Policy control 
Policy controls serve to reduce the friction between the real (or 
predicted) state of environmental systems and the desirable (or socially 
acceptable) state of the environment. However, before such a state will 
be reached, one encounters usually a policy life cycle with four phases: 
awareness, policy formulation, solution, management. This is reflected 
in the figure below adapted from Winsemius (1986). 
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evidence suggests that significant external benefits from the con-
servation of natural capital stocks may be expected. In case of a 
lower social rate of discount, one may expect more maintenance of 
large stocks of natural resources and more available options for 
present and future consumers. 
Thus it is sometimes argued that in case of long-term projects the 
government - as a 'trustee of unborn generations' - should use a 
social rate of discount that is lower than the discount rate 
reflecting the (individual) opportunity cost of postponing the 
consumption of goods or services. This is especially emphasized in 
case of multi-generational evaluation problems, as the usual social 
rate of discount is co-determined by time preferences of in-
dividuals who are neither necessarily concerned with future 
interests of themselves nor of society as a whole (cf. also the so-
called 'isolation paradox'; see Sen, 1967). 
In the past decade the problem of multiple generations has been 
quite extensively discussed in view of the exhaustibility of 
natural resources. The argument for a downward adjustment of the 
social rate of discount is based on the assumption that individuals 
have a myopie view on the future and hence tend to underestimate 
the impacts of current decisions upon long-term welfare related to 
the use of a finite stock of resources (cf. Herfindahl and Kneese, 
1974, Krutilla and Eckstein, 1958, Marglin, 1963, Mishan, 1977, 
Myers, 1977, Page, 1977 and Pearce, 1977). Despite many variations 
in arguments, it is generally accepted that the interest of future 
generations may lead to a downward adjustment of the social rate of 
discount. 
In a recent article by Nijkamp and Rouwendal (1988) the idea of 
flexible social rates of discount was generalized, by assuming a 
series of overlapping future generations each having its own 
specific social rate of discount (given the generation who 
presently has to decide on long-term strategie issues). It could be 
shown that under certain fairly general conditions future welfare 
implications could be fully accounted for in present decision-
making. 
Imposition of Ecological Stock Constraints 
Preservation of ecological stocks has been advocated as a way of 
ensuring sustainable development (see Goodland and Ledec, 1987 and 
Pearce, 1988). This would require a very stringent policy control 
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The shaded area in this figurè indicates that in initial phases there is 
a great deal of uncertainty, conflict or tension on directions where to 
go and policies to adopt. Clearly, the more reliable the dose-effect and 
economie assessment the lower this uncertainty. In any case, based on 
results from scientific analysis, policies are developed as feedback 
mechanisms in order to provide stimuli to an enhancement of environmen-
tal quality. 
The policy controls may be of a varied nature, such as prohibi-
tions, financial penalties, subsidies, R&D investments etc. Of course, 
they depend on the foreseeable or known impact of the pollutant at hand. 
However, a time horizon covering multiple generations is usually 
regarded too long as a basis for immediate policy responses. 'Now the 
question has to be raised whether a re-orientation of our economie 
thinking might be helpful in generating the proper responses from the 
side of both policymakers and polluters. 
4. Policy Responses to PMP Threats 
In view of the aim of an ecologically sustainable economie develop-
ment, various policy responses can be envisaged to cope with the dangers 
of PMP's. In a more general setting, it was recently argued by James at 
al (1989) that the following alternative guidelines for ecological 
preservation might be considered: 
(1) Lowering the social rate of discount 
By lowering the social rate of discount in economie analyses of 
long-term policy programmes or projects with a clear environmental 
implication, the future will automatically be regarded as more 
important than in conventional plan or project evaluation (see 
Gijsbers and Nijkamp 1988 and Nijkamp and Rouwendal 1988). The size 
of renewable resources left to future consumers will vary inversely 
with the social rate of discount. If the discount rate applied is 
relatively high, the stock of renewable resources will be exploited 
at higher rates, leading to a lower stock size (or to extinction at 
the end of the planning period) depending on alternative uses of 
the resource at hand and the discount rate used. Consequently, the 
economie welfare of future consumers may be adversely affected. 
Unfortunately, the benefits of natural resource stock preservation 
tend often to be underestimated. Even though the external costs of 
resource use are sometimes difficult to measure, most ecological 
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on exploitation rates and pollution emission. It is however dif-
ficult to define exactly the meaning of an ecological stock, as 
human activities will always lead to changes (positive and 
negative) in such stocks. Besides, each environmental capital has a 
potential for self-regeneration or rehalibitation, which also has 
to be taken into consideration. Nevertheless, in case of PMP's this 
idea would make sense, if this notion were interpreted as the aim 
to avoid any further increase of the stock of PMP's in the environ-
ment. This idea will be further discussed in section 5. 
(3) Environmental indicators, critical zones and safe minimum standards 
By using a monitoring system based on environmental indicators, a 
timely recognition of critical zones in environmental quality may 
take place. Similarly, one may introducé safe minimum standards in 
order to ensure some quality control on environmental developments 
(see also for a game-theoretic exposition Bishop 1978). Clearly, it 
is not always possible to provide a solid basis for the imposition 
of safe minimum standards, as indicators are not always unambiguous 
(cf. Walters 1986). A major question is also whether such standards 
are necessarily very rigid, whilst ecosystems may go through 
various 'natural' evolutionary stages. Nevertheless, in case of 
dangerous toxic materials (including PMP's) a 'safety first' 
principle is likely a plausible strategy, as will also be further 
outlined in section 5. 
(4) Environmental protection measures 
Such measures take for granted that 'prevention is cheaper than 
cure'. From a long-term economie viewpoint, it is plausible to 
undertake such actions up to the point where the foreseeable mar-
ginal protection benefits are equal to marginal protection costs 
(see Hufschmidt et al. 1983). Clearly, in case of irreversible 
environmental effects stringent protection measures are a neces-
sity. Such measures may of course pertain to both prohibitions (or 
standards) and financial incentives. 
In conclusion, various policy directions can be foliowed. As long 
as large deficiencies in knowledge and predictive capabilities prevail, 
and if social goals other than economie efficiency are to be attained, a 
conservative approach to sustainable development and natural resource 
management is recommended. Economie efficiency analysis can be applied 
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within the constraints imposed by multiple objectives. Future options 
can be kept open by preserving natural capital stocks. In principle this 
can be achieved by use of the policy and management guidelines described 
above. In the next section an attempt will be made to develop a more 
rigorous analytical framework for these observations. 
5. A Policy Model for PMP's 
In the present section we will make a distinction between two types 
of PMP's, viz. those which have an immediate negative impact on the 
ecosystem or on human health and those which have a long-lasting effect 
with latent costs involved. In the first case (e.g. toxic materials) a 
stringent system of prohibitions is necessary in order to prevent fur-
ther harm to the environment or health. In the second case, there is a 
scope for a more flexible policy, in which market incentives may be used 
to stimulate a reduction of waste disposal. The main problem inherent in 
strict prohibitions is the maintenance of policy regulations and laws. 
In various cases illegal practices (e.g., illegal dumping, transport to 
the Third World etc) may occur, which from a long-term perspective leads 
to uncontrolled waste dumping. Therefore, an alternative policy strategy 
for PMP's, based on sound market principles, may be envisaged (see also 
Kahn 1987). This will be clarified by means of a simple model. 
The basic idea is that the stock of PMP's in the environment should 
not exceed a critical acceptance level; this threshold level may be 
related to either the safe minimum Standard or the stock of environmen-
tal capital discussed above. If the current level of the PMP stock is 
below this level, there is for the time being no urgent problem. 
However, if the current level is above the threshold level, a policy 
strategy has to be adopted in order to reduce the current level towards 
the acceptable level by using market incentives. As mentioned above, 
prohibitions might lead to uncontrolled or illegal practice. The same 
holds true for a system of changes, as is shown by clear evidence from 
many countries. Thus essentially the simple 'polluter pays' principle 
tends to fail in the case of PMP's which are often only produced in 
small quantities and hence are easier to dispose. Of course, an alterna-
tive may be a 'pollutee pays' strategy, but this leads usually to strong 
reactions because of the underlying pollution rights principle. In our 
analysis we will propose a compromise version of a standards system, a 
'polluter pays' system and a 'pollutee pays' system. Let us denote the 
stock of dangerous PMP's in the environment by z, measured in terms of 
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mass. Changes in this stock are the result of two forces: a decline 
caused by natural degradation of PMP's and a rise caused by the emission 
of new pollutants to the environment. Then we have in case of an uncon-
trolled disposal of PMP's: 
Z t + l = z t ( 1 " 5 ) + W t < 5 - 1 > 
where 5 is the rate of degradation (or 'depreciation') of the PMP stock 
and w the emission of new PMP's into the environment during year t. We 
will assume here that the critical limit for PMP's is equal to z. Let us 
now assume a regulatory policy for waste disposal, so that w is the 
amount of PMP's properly disposed (i.e. it does not harm the 
environment). Thus the addition to the stock of PMP's is then v -w -w , 
so that (5.1) becomes: 
z t + 1 = z t (1-5) + v t (5.2) 
We also assume fixed emission coefficients for the generation of 
PMP's, so that we have: 
wfc = a qfc (5.3) 
where q is the mass of total production. 
Following Kahn (1987) one may now use a 'deposit-refund' system 
(analogous to the beverage deposit-refund system), which means that, for 
each unit of PMP treated and deposited in a proper way, the producers 
will receive a unit bonus (or deposit-refund) the size of s units. 
However, in order to avoid unlimited production of PMP's and to stimu-
late a reduction of PMP's in production processes, a meaningful way of 
calculating the bonus is to relate the deposit-refund negatively to the 
emission coëfficiënt (i.e., l/a) and positively to the share of PMP's 
properly treated. In other words, the total bonus B would be: 
B t - d/a) (w*/wt) sfc (5.4) 
Wt St 
a w 
It is easily seen that in this case a higher bonus will only be 
gained, if the emission coëfficiënt is reduced, the total amount of 
ie 
waste is reduced or the total amount of properly treated waste is in-
creased. Of course, the higher the value of s the higher the 
probability that w will equal w . 
The determination of the level of s is surrounded with some uncer-
tainty. Assuming now that the costs of the deposit-refund system will 
not be charged to an anonymous agency, but have to be financed out of 
charges to the users of the products that generate PMP's, we may simply 
introducé a unit tax n on all products involved and find the zero-
budgeting condition: 
* 
Wt St 
TT q_ - — - — - (5.5) 
t Mt a w ' 
Next, one may assume a simple demand function with a negative shape with 
respect to the all-in price p , i.e., 
qt - f <Pt) (5.6) 
= f (p* + *t) , 
where p is the net price without environmental charges. 
If in a given situation z > z, the environmental charge % may be 
fixed at such a level that within a given time horizon z will equal z. 
The tax revenues would have to be transferred as financial inputs to the 
deposit-refund system. This mechanism is effective on two sides: it 
stimulates firms to properly treat PMP's (via the bonus system) and it 
stimulates firms to search for technological solutions (via the demand 
elasticity on the basis of pollution charges to the users of products). 
The time period within which one wants to arrive at such a sustainable 
state may be dependent on cost considerations, requiring essentially a 
multi-period optimization model. 
Such a model would incorporate the conflicts between short-term 
economie efficiency and long-term sustainability. Hence two objective 
functions seem to be plausible here: 
min <f>. •= E z (5.7) 
1
 t-0 
and 
T 
max <f>0 = S B e "rt (5.8) 
1
 t-0 
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For the moment, the sustainability objective (5.7) does not have a dis-
count rate, which is a plausible assumption in case of lack of 
information on future impacts of PMP's. 
Instead of objective function (5.7) one might also use a quadratic 
penalty function, i.e. 
T 
min <f>* « E (z - z) 2 (5.9) 
1
 t-0 
We have now essentially a bi-objective optimization model, which 
may be solved by means of discrete control theory. The control 
parameters may in this case be the amount of PMP's properly disposed 
(i.e., w ) and the unit bonus (i.e., s ). 
6. Future Directions 
The previous observations have made clear that care of the bio-
sphere cannot be entrusted to a hidden hand. As pointed out above, human 
interventions in the area of land use, technology and resource extrac-
tion are often a threat to ecologieally sustainable economie 
development. The threats of PMP's are a sad illustration of this situa-
tion. Strategie economie and environmental policy is essentially also a 
risk strategy which serves to minimize the mismatch between economie 
development and ecological sustainability under uncertain future condi-
tions incorporating the dangers of hazardous materials. It seems to be a 
reasonable strategy to maintain the long-run value of the stock of 
'environmental capital', whilst also ensuring sufficiënt diversity. It 
is noteworthy that economie well-being in the long run is dependent on 
the quality of the biosphere. Thus in the long run, the environment 
should be an ally of the economy. This convergence of interests, called 
a co-evolutionary development (Norgaard, 1984), is likely to exist in 
various sectors of environmental management and land use. 
The fact that conventional economie inputs and environmental capi-
tal both may contribute to welfare and may involve a trade-off could 
imply the need to impose minimum achievement levels (or threshold 
levels) for both economie and environmental conditions, in order to 
survive. Thus planning for co-evolutionary development has to be pursued 
with careful consideration of threshold levels for both the economie and 
environmental systems. 
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In this context, the long reaction times of economie and ecological 
processes often conceal the inexorable links between past and future 
events as evident in such phenomena as deforestation, ozonization and 
desertification (Crutzen and Graedel, 1986). Consequently, assuming that 
sustainability strategies are essentially the result of risk aversion 
strategies, there is a need to focus on the long-term evolution of 
economie-ecological systems. A basic problem here is a lack of insight 
into broad-scale environmental changes taking place over a period of 
time that do not synchronize with the response time needed to implement 
effective environmental strategies. 
In the light of uncertainties surrounding sustainability 
strategies, more specific information to make balanced economie-
environmental decisions is needed. Such information might not take the 
form of quantitative data, but rather a set of guiding principles. 
Strategie and preventive strategies regarding PMP control would require 
a special focus on the following guiding principles (see James et al., 
1989): 
identification of the crucial ecological processes, ecosystems and 
resource regenerative systems which form the infrastructure of the 
'natural capital' from which welfare is to be derived in future, 
and of an appropriate set of indicators to monitor quantitative and 
qualitative changes in these processes and systems (e.g., environ-
mental indicators on regulatory, carrier, production and 
information functions of the environmental capital; resource ac-
counting) ; 
identification of long-run driving forces which are most critical 
to sustainability and which impact on both the economy and the 
biosphere (e.g., demographic transitions, technological develop-
ments, socio-cultural changes) and which will have a supra-marginal 
influence on the future welfare of society through sometimes com-
plex economie-environmental interactions; 
identification of conditions under which perturbations (shocks, 
discontinuities, surprises etc.) may come about; imaginative think-
ing, creative environmental entrepreneurship and expert knowledge 
are necessary conditions for becoming aware - on time - of hardly 
foreseeable events. Surprise management is perhaps the key issue in 
environmental sustainability policies, as this is based on an-
ticipatory attitudes that induce preventive actions or rapid 
adjustments; 
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identification of irreversible evolutionary processes. The ag-
gregate result of numerous small-scale environmental 
transformations may be devastating to environmental quality condi-
tions in the long run, as there is no scope for reversibility in 
the foreseeable future; 
Clearly, in view of the great many uncertainties involved in PMP 
policies, there is a need for serious efforts in the area of en-
vironmental monitoring, environmental auditing and environmental 
resource accounting. 
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